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Abstract 
Ma Ying-jeou’s Foreign Aid Policy: 
Two-Level Game Analysis 
TANG An 
International Cooperation Major 
Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 
Under the special Cross-Strait dispute context, foreign aid policy in Taiwan has 
become a necessary means for the government to exchange for diplomatic support 
from the recipient countries and to establish its legitimacy in the international society. 
This practice has made the country’s aid long attached with the negative image of 
“dollar diplomacy” or “checkbook diplomacy.” Since Ma Ying-jeou came to 
presidency in 2008, his different policy choice towards China has done several 
changes to the Taiwanese foreign aid.  
This paper draws from the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game and examines 
Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy making process through both international and 
domestic levels of bargaining. It argues that the two levels coincide on the opinion 
of an improved foreign aid image while disagree on the foreign aid budget. As a 
consequence, Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy presents a different practice and 
outcome in the process of balancing these two level of constraints.  
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1.1. Research Motivation 
Many would certainly believe that Taiwan is not a normal state in terms of its 
political status in the international community. It stays as a de facto sovereign state 
with properly-functioned government and an independent constitution, but it is not 
recognized by many of other states and the United Nations, even though it used to 
be the Organization’s founding member and remained seated for nearly 26 years. 
The reason for this denial is resulted from its dispute with the People’s Republic of 
China (hereinafter referred to as PRC or China) over the legitimacy of representing 
the only Chinese government. This political reality has made Taiwan’s foreign policy 
an inseparable part of its Cross-Strait policy. Leaderships in Taiwan have long 
struggled in striking a balance between the two.  
Today, there are 21 countries in the world that support Taiwan’s legitimacy.1 
The reason behind this has a lot to do with the Taiwanese government’s use of foreign 
aid to exchange for diplomatic support ever since the 1960s. This nature has made 
Taiwan a special case for foreign aid policy studies. Several reasons make it relevant 
to the research topic. First of all, unlike many other donors, motivation of Taiwan’s 
foreign aid policy is explicit. While donors often provide foreign aid out of 
complicated, mixed considerations (such as political and/or economic interests), 
Taiwan’s motive is rather simple – its foreign aid serves for the country’s foreign 
                                                
1 As of December 2016, Taiwan has established official diplomatic relations with 21 
countries. Accessed December 31, 2016. http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en 
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policy goal of earning diplomatic support internationally. This motive has already 
been proved by many previous researches in this field (Chan 1997; Lin 1999; 
Tubilewicz and Guilloux 2011).  
Second reason of the case choice is that, because of the explicit diplomatic 
objective and its special relations with China, unlike many other donor countries, 
there is an atypical donor-recipient relationship existing between Taiwan and its 
diplomatic allies. Knowing that Taiwan is in urgent need of diplomatic support, the 
diplomatic allies are, therefore, in a superior bargaining position. They are able to 
manipulate the unequal relations by threatening to discontinue official recognitions 
if Taiwan does not accept their request. This has caused several major scandals 
related to corruption, bribery, and sovereignty issues. 
Considering the unbalanced relationships, political leaders in Taiwan are 
always left in a difficult situation as to either accept the request of providing a 
handsome amount of foreign aid, or refuse the unreasonable request and endanger 
the bilateral relationships that support Taiwan in the international arena. 
This situation, however, has changed since Ma Ying-jeou came to presidency. 
Recognizing that the main reason of Taiwan’s difficult situation comes from China, 
Ma adopted a different foreign policy from previous governments. Unlike his 
predecessor Chen Shui-bian who adopted an aggressive foreign policy and 
continuously emphasized Taiwan’s sovereignty to be separated from China, Ma 
Ying-jeou’s strategy was to reconcile with China and enhance the bilateral 
relationship in all aspects. Under this intended goal, his government avoided 
engaging in diplomatic activities that could possibly touch upon the sensitive One-
China policy and could harm the bilateral relation. His government no longer insisted 
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on participating in international organizations under the name of Taiwan but 
accepted other names that are feasible. For instance, it joined the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2009 
and 2013 separately under the name “Chinese Taipei,” marking the first time that 
Taiwan has been included in any UN entities ever since its withdrawal from the 
organization in 1971.  
Among all Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign policies, the one with greatest importance 
is that he ended the long-simmering competition for diplomatic allies with China. 
Previous Chen Shui-bian’s administration had actively engaged in diplomatic 
activities, such as frequently visiting diplomatic allies, and increasing national 
budget on foreign aid year after year, in an attempt to earn the allied governments’ 
support for Taiwan instead of China. Unlike Chen, Ma Ying-jeou proposed to stop 
the vicious competition with China and to reduce budget on foreign aid. His 
government emphasized on the responsibility to help developing countries through 
rightful practices. As a consequence, he successfully maintained Taiwan’s ally 
counts, and his foreign aid budget started to drop year by year. 
This paper draws from Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game theory in 1988 to 
examine how Taiwan’s foreign aid policy has been influenced under both 
international and domestic constraints. This theory is applicable to the Taiwanese 
case when it began to democratize since late 1980s. The emergence of the first 
opposing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after the government lifted 
the long-running martial law marked a significant stage in the Taiwan society when 
the domestic groups began to have influence over the government’s decision making. 
The general public started to raise voices through the representation of political 
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parties as well. Thus, the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game provides a 
proper basis in explaining the effect of domestic factors over Taiwanese 
government’s foreign policy making ever since 1980s. 
In contrast to the explaining power of domestic factors, the theory has better 
applicability on Ma Ying-jeou’s administration than the previous Chen Shui-bian’s 
term when includes the international constraints onto the government policy. Chen’s 
government cared less about international pressure and criticism and went on 
pursuing the “aggressive” foreign policy that created diplomatic events that damaged 
Taiwan’s reputation internationally. The level of international constraints, therefore, 
has little explaining ability to Chen Shui-bian. On the contrary, Ma Ying-jeou and 
his government put improving Taiwan’s international reputation as a priority and 
continuously emphasized the government’s intention to follow the doctrines of 
international community especially in the field of development. This difference 
makes the Two-Level Game theory has more implications on Ma Ying-jeou’s policy 




1.2. Research Question 
As elaborated previously, Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency represents a critical 
juncture in Taiwan’s foreign aid policy as he proposed a peaceful relationship with 
China. Under the circumstances, the main questions that this paper aims at 
addressing are: “What are the major factors that influence Ma Ying-jeou’s 
foreign aid policy choice? How are his policy outcomes different from the 
previous governments?” Under the condition that Cross-Strait tension seemed to 
ease with Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign policy, it is interesting to see if domestic factors 
become a significant variable that influences Taiwan’s foreign aid policy. 
 
1.3. Hypothesis 
Drawing from the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game, this paper 
proposes that Taiwan’s foreign aid policy making under Ma Ying-jeou can be 
conceptualized as a process of two-level game bargaining, balancing between the 
international and domestic tables. The international community urged Taiwanese 
government to improve its foreign aid practices that had caused several major 
scandals related to bribery and sovereignty intervention. In the meantime, they 
continuously pressured Taiwan to play a bigger role in the field of development, 
since it is now wealthy enough to do so. At the domestic level, the general public 
was overwhelmingly against the practices of dollar diplomacy and demanded the 
government to reduce national budget on foreign aid. Putting this bargaining process 
into the terms proposed by the Two-Level Game theory, this paper argues that the 
“win-sets” of Ma Ying-jeou’s government overlap at that both levels wanted to 
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improve the negative image of Taiwanese aid while disagree on the size of aid. As a 
negotiator, Ma Ying-jeou’s proposed policy, diplomatic truce, is therefore the 
outcome of the two-level bargaining process, where he managed to reduce negative 
aid practices and adjust aid budget to areas needed to satisfy the constraints at both 
levels. 
 
1.4. Significance of Thesis 
This paper contributes to the discussion of donor’s foreign aid policy making 
that applies the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game. It examines not only the 
traditional focus on donor’s motivation but also the role of contextual factors on 
influencing donor’s policy choice. Unlike previous studies that overly emphasized 
on either international environment constraints or domestic politics in Taiwanese aid, 
this paper stress the significance on the interactions between the two variables and 
how negotiators and decision makers in Taiwan balance between the two constraints 
and adopt strategy to achieve the intended outcomes. By laying out factors 
determining Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy making from 2008 to 2016, this paper 
is able to provide implications for future policy-makers when dealing with 
Taiwanese aid and Cross-Strait relations. 
 
1.5. Structure of Thesis 
This paper is organized as follows. It begins in Chapter II with a discussion on 
the two biggest approaches of studying Taiwan’s foreign aid policy and examines 
the applicability to this paper. It then proposes the Two-Level Game theory and the 
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Case Study method to be the feasible analytical framework to answer the research 
questions. Next, the historical evolution of Taiwanese aid is introduced to capture 
the significance of foreign aid in the country’s foreign policy and to further identify 
possible variables that could affect Ma Ying-jeou’s policy making for later analysis. 
Chapter IV then draws on the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game and 
demonstrates Ma Ying-jeou’s policy making process throughout the bargaining 
between the government and the international community (Level I) and the domestic 
constituents (Level II). This paper also discuss how Ma’s foreign aid policy is 
different from his predecessors under the sub-sections of “International-Domestic 
Synergy.” The paper then concludes with remarks and implications on the future 




II. Analytical Framework 
 
2.1. Previous Studies 
Throughout the existing literature on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy, scholarships 
can be generally categorized into two major approaches. One scholarship starts with 
the donor’s perspective and studies Taiwan’s motivation of providing foreign aid and 
choosing aid-receiving targets. The other major scholarship focuses on contextual 
factors and their impact on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy. This section discusses these 
two major approaches on studying Taiwan’s foreign aid policy and their applicability 
in answering the proposed research questions of this paper. 
 
2.1.1. Motivation Approach 
Most of the early studies on Taiwan’s foreign aid focus on the motivation of 
providing foreign aid and consider it a means for the country to purse power in the 
international relations. This development is relevant with the Cold War context. 
Foreign aid during the Cold War era was considered an instrument for many 
countries to pursue power in the international society. States provide incentives or 
threats to alter other states’ policies in order to achieve their own foreign policy 
goals. Morgenthau (1962) concluded six types of aid: humanitarian foreign aid, 
subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and 
foreign aid for economic development, and concluded that, except for humanitarian 
aid, the other five types of aid more or less have explicit political nature (Morgenthau 
1962, 301). Even humanitarian aid, he noted, could sometimes be disbursed in an 
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attempt to gain political influence in the recipient countries or in the international 
society. Sogge (2002) further categorized foreign aid into five major incentives. 
Firstly, socio-political motives that are based on national interests. For instance, 
United States’ providing aid to Taiwan and South Korea during the Cold War era in 
an attempt to counter the expansion of Communism could be examples. Secondly, 
mercantile motives, such as Japan and US, for their foreign aid policies are usually 
intertwined with their intentions to expand overseas markets. Thirdly, some Nordic 
countries have strong humanitarian and ethical motives in providing largely untied, 
multilateral aid to developing countries. Fourthly, aid provided out of compensate 
for losses, such as Japan’s aid-giving after World War II. Lastly, common interest 
between donors and recipients. Donors provide aid in exchange for the recipients’ 
cooperation, such as combating international crime, terrorism, illegal immigrants, 
and so on. 
This scholarship assumes that donor’s motivation is what determines the 
characteristics of interactions between donor and recipient. That being said, bilateral 
relations on foreign aid are always initiated by donor country instead of recipient 
country. Donor’s motivation determines the country’s foreign policy goal and 
reflects on the distribution of its aid (Ekeh 1974). The approach has often been 
adopted in studying Taiwan’s foreign aid policy in early stages. Literatures before 
2000 generally agree that Taiwanese aid serves as a significant instrument for the 
country’s foreign policy goal: countering diplomatic isolation that is caused by the 
Cross-Strait disputes. Some see aid as an effective tool to achieve foreign policy 
goals (Chan 1997; Lee 1993; Lin 1999; Taylor 2002) while some recognize its 
limitations under the circumstances of China’s rising power and outweighing 
economic strength over Taiwan (Ko 2003; Taylor 2002).  
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Whether foreign aid serves as an effective diplomatic tool for Taiwan or not, 
several weaknesses of these studies could be pointed out. First of all, most of these 
studies focus primarily on the perspective of donors while neglecting the motivations 
of recipients that could play a role in influencing Taiwan’s foreign aid policy 
behavior. Contrary to donor’s political or diplomatic motivations, recipient’s 
motivations are usually economic. With the increasing economic power of China, 
perspectives of the recipients become especially vital in understanding why some 
recipients would accept aid from China instead of Taiwan, or vice versa.  
Second limitation of this approach is the difficulty in identifying donor’s 
motivation if lacking supportive data. As mentioned earlier, motivations of donor’s 
providing foreign aid are usually multi-layered, combining with both political and 
economic motivations. In the meantime, donors seldom explicitly tell their political 
intentions but use indirect approaches to achieve their political goals or emphasize 
on the economic impact on the development of recipients (Browne 1990). If 
researchers cannot find sufficient data to support the analysis of policy choice, results 
of adopting this approach could be limited. 
Lastly, researches on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy using the motivation 
approach usually take on the national level of analysis. They see the country as the 
sole actor while paying little attention to the internal factors and dynamic that could 
influence foreign aid policy making. Therefore, another approach that focuses on the 





2.1.2. Contextual Approach 
Teh-chang Lin (1999) in his book A comparative study on foreign aid policy 
across Taiwan Strait put forward the contextual approach as an analytical framework 
to compare Taiwan’s and China’s foreign aid policies. Lin considered foreign aid to 
be the output and practice of a country’s foreign policy. Therefore, sufficient foreign 
aid data and statistics could be important indicators to analyze donor’s foreign policy. 
Contextual approach assumes that donor’s foreign aid policy and aid-giving behavior 
are guided by its foreign policy goals and strategies. Foreign aid policy serves as the 
dependent variable for analysis here. Internal and external factors as independent 
variables would lead to different foreign policies and further affect the nature of 
donor’s foreign aid policy and its choice of recipients. Once the relevant variables 
are identified and controlled, the researchers will be able to explain donor’s aid-
giving behavior. 
Throughout the literatures on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy, the external factors 
have always been the major concern of scholars. These scholarships examine the 
interactions between Taiwan and other international actors and generally reach 
similar conclusions that Taiwan’s foreign aid is a product of sovereignty dispute and 
unbalanced power distribution across the Taiwan Strait (Chan 1997; Lee 1993; 
Taylor 2002). That being said, external factors are what determine the characteristics 
of Taiwanese aid. These scholarships may be right in analyzing the early stages of 
Taiwan’s aid policy since domestic politics were not so energetic as it is today. 
However, scholars pay little attention to internal factors and their possible effects on 
Taiwanese leaders’ policy choice even after Taiwan has democratized since 1980s.  
A few recent studies start to look at the role of internal factors on Taiwan’s 
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foreign aid policy. Tubilewicz (2016), for instance, looked into the competitions 
among political parties and government agencies and concluded that internal factors 
are what shaped Taiwan’s foreign aid policy, rather than the conventional Cross-
Strait conflicts that scholars used to think. He further indicated that it was the state 
transformation process during partisan competition and formation of nationalism 
that influenced the various aspects of Taiwan’s foreign aid-giving. This scholarship 
succeeded in providing a systematic review on domestic factors and their effects on 
Taiwan’s foreign aid policy and yet, has the same problem of being narrow-sighted. 
By simply including internal factors while ruling out external factors, readers are not 
able to know how much internal factors weigh over external factors.  
Concluded from the above discussions on previous studies, this paper argues 
that contextual approach is more applicable to this research than motivation 
approach, as motivation approach has several limitations in weighing too much on 




2.2. Theoretical Framework 
From the previous discussions on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy, this paper 
adopts Robert Putnam’s (1988) theory of Two-Level Games as the main theoretical 
basis for analysis. This theory was derived from the 1980s when scholars of 
international relations, after long debating on whether a country’s foreign policy is 
determined by the international system or domestic politics, started to draw a linkage 
between the two concerns. In the article Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic 
of Two-Level Games, Putnam put forward the idea that interactions and negotiations 
between countries can generally be seen as a two-level game: 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments (Putnam 1988, 434).  
In other words, a country’s foreign policy making is determined by both international 
and domestic environments. A leader or a decision-maker must take into account 
both factors to satisfy actors at both levels when making his or her foreign policy. 
The detailed process of policy making proposed by the theory can be further 
explained by the following illustration.  
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Figure 1. Putnam's Two-Level Game theory 
Source: Putnam, 1988. 
 
Having the aforementioned concepts in mind, Putnam supposed that leaders 
or negotiators representing two countries meet to reach an agreement, and they 
already know that the agreement needs to be ratified by their respective constituents. 
The ratification process could be decomposed into two stages. Level I suggests the 
bargaining process between negotiators from the two countries at international level, 
and they are to reach a tentative agreement. Level II refers to the discussion process 
within each country between the leaders and the constituents about whether to accept 
the proposed agreement. In addition, negotiators of Level I are political leaders or 
decision-makers while the domestic constituents are usually bureaucratic agencies, 
interest groups, social classes, or even public opinion.  
The theory suggests that the foreign policy output is the outcome of both 
international as well as domestic negotiations. Therefore, in order to strike a balance 
at both levels and reach an agreement of policy that can be ratified, the idea of “win-
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set” is of great importance. Win-sets are defined by Putnam as “all possible Level I 
agreements that would gain the majority among the constituents (Putnam 1988, 
437).” The size of win-sets determines the possibility of an agreement that can be 
ratified, and it is therefore important to know what affects the size of win-sets since 
under most circumstances, the bigger win-sets both sides have, the more likely that 
the win-sets are able to overlap and reach an agreement. The size of win-sets is 
determined by three major factors: the power distribution at Level II constituents, 
the political institutions at Level II, and the strategies of the Level II negotiators.  
This theory is chosen as it can best describe the logic of Taiwan’s foreign aid 
policy, considering possible contextual factors from both external and internal 
environments. The two-level game theory has been used to discuss the Cross-Strait 
negotiations in many researches. For instance, Samuel S. G. Wu (1999) adopted the 
game theory to the two-level negotiations at both sides and found that Cross-Strait 
negotiations generally have the characteristics of unequal resource distribution, 
disparity in cognition, multiple agendas, two-stages, non-binding agreements, etc. 
He concluded that the nature of two-level game in Cross-Strait negotiations 
explained how domestic politics affect the negotiator’s behavior in international 
bargaining table and how both sides apply strategies to increase their win-sets and 
enhance their bargaining power. Guo and Lin (2000) applied the two-level game 
theory to President Lee Teng-hui’s Two-State theory and examined the rationale 
behind Lee’s policy choice and the timing and constraints of his proposing the theory. 
Guo and Lin concluded that Lee Teng-hui, as a decision-maker, had to balance 
between internal and external constraints rather than following his individual 
preferences. Chang (2002) compared the power balancing and negotiations across 
the Strait in different stages from three perspectives – agenda, negotiator, and 
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constituent – and found that the win-sets of both sides overlapped at the One-China-
with-Respective-Interpretations policy instead of the extreme ends of either Taiwan-
as-an-Independent-Country or One-People’s Republic China. 
Therefore, from the aforementioned studies, we know that the two-level game 
theory is applicable to the case of Taiwan for it has the power to answer the research 
question of what makes Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy by decomposing his 
policy making process into two stages externally and internally. However, different 
from most of the Taiwanese foreign policy studies that lay emphasis on the impact 
of domestic politics on international relations than the other way around, this paper 
focuses on both ways. It aims at understanding how domestic constituents influence 
international relations and how international relations affect domestic politics in the 
context of Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy making.  
Several actors during the bargaining process are examined in this paper. At 
Level I international bargaining, three major actors and their roles are discussed: 
international community as a whole entity, recipient countries of Taiwan’s foreign 
aid (namely its diplomatic allies), and the major constraint of its foreign policy – 
China. These three are the major foreign actors in the process of Taiwan’s foreign 
aid policy making. As for the Level II national level bargaining, domestic groups are 
the major concern. It consists of the two major political parties in Taiwan, KMT and 
DPP, and the general public opinion among Taiwanese people. The national level 
bargaining presents how political parties capture the major public opinion on foreign 




This paper employs an empirical case study method. Case study method, 
according to Arend Lijphart (1971), has the advantage for researchers to intensively 
examine the chosen case when the resources are limited. It also contributes to the 
establishment of general propositions or building theories. Several types of case 
study methods are distinguished by scholars, and this paper employs the typology of 
Interpretive Case Studies by Lijphart or Theory-guide Case Studies by Levy (2008). 
Lijphart argued that interpretive case studies apply a generalization to the selected 
case in an attempt to “throw light on the case rather than improving the generalization 
in any way” and considered this study method more of an applied science (Lijphart 
1971, 692). Levy also pointed out that, by employing a well-developed conceptual 
framework, this method could focus on “theoretically specified aspects of reality” 
and provide better explanations to the key aspects of the chosen case (Levy 2008, 4). 
By employing a simple model of two-level game, this paper examines Ma 
Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy making in the international and domestic tables and 
finds that Ma Ying-jeou’s policy choice of a less radical foreign aid policy was the 
outcome of negotiations and bargaining at the two tables, where excessive foreign 
aid policy was no longer desirable for the general public while the international 
community continuously demanded for his greater contribution to the developing 
field. 
In conducting the research, sources collected for analysis are diverse. Data of 
Ma Ying-jeou government’s policy making is adopted from the official statements 
and documents, among which the 2009 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy is of 
paramount significance to analyze the leadership’s intension and behavior. In the 
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meanwhile, annual reports on government’s aid work issued by the International 
Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF), main aid agency of Taiwan, are also 
adopted as references. Regarding Ma’s interaction with domestic constituencies, 
legislative records, opinion polls, and official policy statements by the presidential 
candidates are analyzed to understand the public opinions towards his policy. 
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III. Historical Evolution of “Taiwanese Aid” 
 
3.1. From Recipient to Donor 
In order to understand the rationale behind Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy, 
one must place it into the historical framework of how Taiwan has become what it is 
today, and what has been the role of foreign aid throughout its history of 
development. This chapter explains that gaining diplomatic recognition has been an 
important part of Taiwan’s foreign policy as a means to counter its isolated 
international status and to defend sovereignty under the context of Cross-Strait 
relations. Foreign aid, therefore, has become an instrument to achieve Taiwan’s 
foreign policy goal. 
Taiwan used to be an aid recipient from the 1950s until the 1980s. Due to the 
broader context of cold war, especially after the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, the 
United States needed to increase its allies in East Asia in order to counter with the 
Communist forces from the Soviet Union and the PRC. Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan, therefore, were included in this containment line because of their geopolitical 
importance. To enhance military strength of these countries based on the US interest, 
it provided huge military and economic assistance during the war period. Roughly 
USD 100 million value of assistance was given to Taiwan every year (MOFA 2009). 
The assistance came in the form of military and daily commodities, as well as loans 
and technical assistance to help strengthen Taiwan’s military power. In the meantime, 
Taiwan also utilized these funds on major infrastructures for development. Although 
it is debatable whether assisting Taiwan’s economic development was the American 
interest, scholars generally agreed that without the economic assistance from the US 
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and many other donors at the initial stage of development, Taiwan would have not 
been able to achieve impressive economic development in the latter half of twentieth 
century (Chiang 2014; Chang and Lee 2014).2  
This experience of having been an aid recipient serves as a significant part of 
Taiwan’s foreign aid policy to other developing countries later on. The narrative of 
Taiwan’s responsibility to “give back” what it had gained from the international 
community has been constantly used by the government and political leaders as a 
rhetoric and public diplomacy to justify Taiwan’s aid giving. In fact, not only Taiwan, 
similar strategy has been used by other donor countries, such as South Korea, to 
justify the government’s foreign aid-giving. By doing so, the government may be 
able to ease the public doubts and criticism on why the government has to help other 
countries while it already has many problems in its own country. Moreover, by 
putting forward terms such as “Taiwan experience” or “Korean experience” of 
development, the government also shapes a national identity that makes its people 
feel proud of its own development experience as to be able to help others, making 
its foreign aid-giving easier to be accepted. 
Taiwan started to provide foreign aid to other developing countries in the 
1960s as a means to earn support from the international community. Since 1949 when 
the KMT-led Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, both sides across the Taiwan 
Strait have been competing to represent “the only legitimate government of China.” 
In order to secure representation in its most important seat in the international 
                                                
2 Besides the US being the earliest and biggest donor, Taiwan also received aid from Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, and the Asian Development 
Bank during its development stage from the 1950s to the 1980s (MOFA 2009). 
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community, the UN, Taiwan began to provide economic assistance to other countries 
in exchange for diplomatic recognition as well as their support of its solely 
representation in the UN. Along with the economic assistance from the US 
government, Taiwan launched its first agricultural technical assistance aid program 
(“Operation Vanguard”) in the 1960s. 
This strategy worked well because it had successfully targeted the emerging 
countries and their development needs. With the ending of WWII, a great number of 
former colonies declared independence. As of the year 1960 only, there were 17 
newly independent countries in Africa. Due to the colonial legacy and other complex 
reasons, these newly independent countries were usually underdeveloped, lack of 
institutions and governance. Taiwan’s foreign aid came in at the right moment as 
these countries were in urgent need of resources to finance for their development. 
This was a win-win agreement for both sides. For Taiwan, theses developing 
countries’ voices were of great importance, especially in the UN where one country 
owns one vote. The more diplomatic allies it has, the more likely it would benefit 
from issues that need more votes in the UN. For the recipient countries, on the other 
hand, all they had to do to exchange for development aid was merely offering 
diplomatic recognitions and occasionally speak for Taiwan in the international arena, 
which actually cost nothing in physical form. As a result of this strategy, the number 
of countries that supported Taiwan’s membership in the UN rose to 17 in Africa only, 
including two countries that did not establish any official ties with Taiwan. 
Compared to this, only two African countries supported Taiwan’s membership 
before the program had launched in 1960 (Ko 2003).  
Unfortunately, despite the efforts, in 1971, the UN Resolution Number 2785 
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determined Beijing as the solely legitimate government that represents China. The 
government in Taiwan then lost its membership in the UN and began to face hostile 
diplomatic situation as many countries also shift recognition from Taipei to Beijing.3 
To survive the diplomatic isolation, the Taiwanese government considered that 
diplomatic recognition to be the necessary means and foreign policy goal to cope 
with its isolation and maintain Taiwan’s international status. Under this premise, 
foreign aid, for it once contributed to Taiwan’s survival during the 1960s, were place 
to a higher position to be the instrument to serve the government’s foreign policy. 
Despite harsh international circumstances after withdrawal from the UN, 
Taiwan was able to secure its allies counts and even increase a certain number of 
allies in the following decade, with its relatively stronger economic power in relation 
to China.4 Newnham (2000) estimated that the average annual GNP growth rate in 
the 1980s was 9.2 percent. Due to this economic strength, the government was able 
to provide larger amount of foreign aid to “buy” diplomatic recognition from 
developing countries. By 1988, for instance, the government had provided 
approximately USD 100 million value of foreign aid annually to 20 countries in Latin 
American and Caribbean (“Caribbean Basin Initiative”). As a result of this economic 
strength, 15 of theses aid recipients offered diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. 
There is a clear positive relation between the Taiwanese aid and the number of 
                                                
3 In 1963, 58 countries recognized the government of Taiwan and only 42 recognized PRC 
as the legitimate Chinese government. Yet, by 1977, there were 111 countries that favored 
PRC while only 23 still recognized Taiwan (Newnham 2000). 
4 Taiwan’s GNP per capita was estimated at an approximate number of USD 13,000 in 




its allies. As a foreign ministry official once noted, at this stage, “Taiwan could 
purchase recognition from an average-sized Third World country with about 20 
million dollars in easy credit (Newnham 2000, 273).” The effectiveness of using 
foreign aid to “buy” diplomatic allies had been confirmed from the increasing ally 
counts year by year. Believing that its economic strength would promise it more 
allies and help maintain its international status to a certain degree, the government 
continuously place foreign policy goals as a priority for its foreign aid practices. 
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3.2. Aid in Transition 
Aid in Taiwan came to a transition period with the democratization process 
that started in the late 1980s. Despite its success in keeping certain number with 
allies to cope with harsh situation after being expelled from the UN, public debates 
and criticism on the government’s foreign aid and foreign policy came along with 
the emergence of partisan politics during Taiwan’s democratization.  
Before democratization, the Island was under KMT-governed Martial Law and 
no opposition political parties and elections were allowed. The general public’s voice 
on government’s foreign aid policy was unheard. Since the late 1980s, the 
democratization process motivated the criticism on KMT-led government’s generous 
aid policy, questioning whether giving considerable amount of taxpayer’s money in 
maintaining a rather small number of allies would be worthwhile (Lee 1993). 
President Lee Teng-hui’s foreign aid policy of using economic resources to expand 
Taiwan’s international space indeed had succeeded in earning a number of 
diplomatic allies, but it is now facing domestic doubts whether his policy would still 
be effective since the “Republic of China (ROC)” gradually lost its appeal in the 
international society. 
Democratization of the state and issue of national identity that came along 
drove the public debates on the use of foreign aid. Domestically, President Lee Teng-
hui gradually moved away from the government’s claim since 1949 that “ROC 
represents the only China” when he sensed the emerging public doubts and the 
opposition force from the other political party DPP in the process democratization. 
The opposing DPP criticized President Lee’s diplomacy and claimed that Taiwan 
should first declare its independence; then it would be able to provide aid base on 
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the recipient needs and the genuine purpose of development (Lee 1993). Given the 
situation that DPP is gaining domestic support for its pro-independence position, 
President Lee gradually adjusted his policy to appeal to the public. He adopted a new 
diplomacy approach, claiming that his aid diplomacy was now to protect the ROC’s 
sovereignty on Taiwan rather than to compete with Beijing over the only legitimate 
representation of China, as an attempt to win over the DPP supporters. He also 
accepted countries to recognize both Taiwan and China at the same time, despite that 
Beijing still cling on to its One-China policy.  
National identity had been changing from time to time throughout the process 
of democratization. As mentioned earlier, more people have acknowledged the fact 
that competing for the “only Chinese government” with China was no longer feasible 
both political and economic-wise. The practice of dollar diplomacy was also losing 
its appeal because it appeared to be no longer effective to compete with the rising 
power of China. Under this condition, DPP’s policy to emphasize the Taiwanese 
identity seemed to provide the people hope for this predicament. Taiwan’s foreign 
aid policy, therefore, has been constantly revisiting under the process of domestic 
negotiations. 
The country’s international reputation was another concern of its aid practice. 
Taiwan’s economic and political performance has earned it international praise, 
especially when contrasting with the Communist Chinese government. Taiwanese 
government considered its international reputation to be significant to win unofficial 
support from other countries, especially the Western powers. It tried to achieve this 
by establishing representative offices that enjoy the same privileges as regular 
embassies, providing visa exemptions, and signing bilateral trade agreements as 
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unofficial relations as a substitute for diplomatic recognition.  
Nevertheless, money diplomacy still represented an inseparable part of 
Taiwan’s image. During President Chen Shui-bian’s administration, Taiwan suffered 
serious damage to its reputation on aid programs. Media had reported several times 
that Taiwanese aid had interfered in domestic politics of its recipients (e.g. Zambia, 
the Solomon Islands, and several of its Caribbean allies) although the Taiwanese 
government denied these accusations (Huang 2006; Painter 2004; RNZI 2006). 
Competition on aid diplomacy between Taiwan and China was also the target of 
condemnation that undermines good governance in the recipient government. The 
public, fearing that these accusations and negative image would undermine Taiwan’s 
effort in winning Western support, their discontent on the government’s aid policy 
began to increase. 
Secrecy of aid budget served as another target of public criticism. Taiwanese 
government never published its aid amount channeled to single recipient. This 
number remains secret even until today, fearing its competitor China would offer 
more as incentive for diplomatic recognition, or the Taiwan’s recipients would 
compare with each other and thus ask for more.5 This gave room for the opposition 
party to criticize or even exaggerate the foreign aid budget. President Lee Teng-hui’s 
aid diplomacy was criticized strongly by its biggest opponent DPP for overly 
                                                




generous and unaccountable on decision-making process.6 Therefore, when the DPP 
came into power in the presidential house in 2000, President Chen Shui-bian 
promised to be more discreet with the use of aid. Under huge criticism, his words 
translated into actual deeds on a reduced aid budget compared to Lee. 
China remained a crucial factor in affecting Taiwan’s aid policy at this stage. 
With its growing economic strength, China was able to win over Taiwan’s diplomatic 
allies by offering more aid money. For instance, the media reported that the 
Caribbean island of Dominica has shifted its recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 
2004, for one reason that Beijing agreed to offer USD 100 million in aid over a five-
year term – an amount that accounted half of the country’s annual per capita income 
and outweighed what Taiwan had given in the past years (Painter 2004). China’s 
“war plan” had caused Taiwan in losing six diplomatic allies during President Chen’s 
eight year of presidencies (see Figure 2). Now that increasing aid budget to counter 
China’s aggressive move was no longer a feasible option due to the lack of domestic 
support and more powerful legislature on aid budget, the government then sought 
for ways that did not involve money, such as making presidential visits to its 
diplomatic allies or hosting regional groupings to “avoid being held hostage by one” 
(Atkinson 2014, 417). The government also became more discreet in establishing 
new ties under the circumstances that the potential partner’s political environment 
was stable and supported establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
  
                                                
6 It was reported that President Lee promised USD 1.6 billion in aid to Macedonia in 
exchange for diplomatic recognition in 1999, USD 300 million aid package for a 
reconstruction in Kosovo, USD 1 billion aid package to Albania in 1999, and USD 2 billion 
to Papua New Guinea (Tubilewicz 2016). 
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Figure 2. Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies, 1988-2015  
Note: Years of president in position: Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000), Chen Shui-
bian (2000-2008), Ma Ying-jeou (2000-2016), Tsai Ing-wen (2016-) 
     Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan. 
 
To sum up, throughout the historical development until this stage, foreign aid 
had been mainly subject to the use of supporting foreign policy of Taiwan to fulfill 
its national interests to survive diplomatic isolation. However, when entering into 
the democratization period in the late 1980s, more factors had emerged and affected 
the use of Taiwanese aid. These factors are both internal and external, such as 
partisan competition, state transformation, raising Taiwan’s international reputation, 
and legislature on aid secrecy and decision making process. In the meantime, the 
china factor never once disappeared from the variables that affected foreign aid 














































































IV. Ma Ying-jeou’s Foreign Aid Policy 
 
4.1. Improving the Image of Taiwanese Aid 
Putnam’s (1988) Two-Level Game suggests that a country’s policy making is 
an outcome of two-stage negotiations, where a proposed policy at international table 
needs to gain the majority among the country’s constituents, and vice versa. 
Adopting this theoretical framework, this paper demonstrates the negotiations of 
Taiwan’s foreign aid policy at both international and domestic levels and further 
analyzes how Ma Ying-jeou, under constraints at both levels, adopted a different 
strategy to satisfy both levels and reached the intended outcome. 
 
4.1.1. International Constraint 
As elaborated in Chapter III, Taiwan had suffered from negative image of its 
dollar diplomacy during previous terms of presidency. Its foreign aid had often 
linked with the negative images of “bribery,” “corruption” and “non-transparent” 
when it used foreign aid to exchange for official recognitions of its legal status and 
sovereignty from recipient countries. It had frequently been reported by international 
media to be involved in scandals related to foreign elections. One case that seriously 
damaged Taiwan’s reputation was the Papua New Guinea case happened during both 
Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s presidencies.  
Papua New Guinea first established official relations with Taiwan in 1999. 
Unexpectedly, this relationship lasted for two weeks only. The bilateral relationship 
stopped right after the former Prime Minister Bill Skate was accused of demanding 
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a USD 2.3 billion loan from Taiwan in exchange for Papua New Guinea’s diplomatic 
recognition. Two weeks later, the newly-elected Prime Minister Mekere Morauta 
withdrew this agreement under Beijing’s pressure. This was listed by Time Magazine 
as the “best scandals of the year,” imposing serious damage to Taiwan’s international 
reputation (Times Asia 1999).  
Likewise, the Chen Shui-bian administration tried to earn Papua New 
Guinea’s favor again by arranging two middlemen to help establish official bilateral 
relations. Taiwan’s foreign ministry provided USD 30 million as an exchange for 
Papua New Guinea’s diplomatic recognition, but unfortunately, this money was 
embezzled by the two middlemen after negotiation failed between the officials at 
two sides (The Wall Street Journal 2008). These disclosures triggered great criticism 
from the international community as Taiwan was accused of intervening other 
country’s sovereignty by engaging in foreign elections with its own money.  
In the Two-Level Game theory, Putnam (1988) explained how one country 
tries to alter another country’s perception to reach the agreement it wants by 
persuading opinion leaders on the other side. In the case of Papua New Guinea, 
government of Taiwan provided foreign aid in exchange for opinion leader’s 
diplomatic recognition is the very presentation of this logic. On the perspective of 
the receiving country, its leader could use this money as a bargaining gambit to 
promise economic development for the country as a way to earn more votes for 
himself or herself. This win-win cooperation seemed to work well as both sides got 
what they wanted. However, it was unable to satisfy the criticism of accusing Taiwan 
of intervening internal affairs of other countries. The international community 
especially criticized Taiwan as not genuinely care about its recipient’s development 
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because it withdrew foreign aid immediately once the recipient shifts its recognition.  
Huge criticism on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy created a negative image for a 
long time in the international society. This has suggested several things. First of all, 
Taiwan needs friendly relations with these countries as it needed their support in the 
international community. One of the several conditions for developing countries to 
receive Taiwanese aid is to not only provide official diplomatic recognition, but also 
to represent Taiwan’s interests in the international arena. Therefore, maintaining 
friendly relations with the allies is of great importance for the government, and 
negative image of Taiwan would make its own win-sets in the ally countries smaller 
as the people gains negative impression on Taiwanese aid.  
Secondly, Taiwan needed not only the diplomatic allies but also the whole 
international community’s support to not exclude it from the international affairs. 
Negative reputation does nothing good if the Taiwanese government wants to expand 
its space in the world. Therefore, these pressures acted as constraints to the Ma Ying-
jeou government and his foreign aid policy. In the meantime, if this negative image 
continues to deteriorate, it is also very likely to affect domestic Taiwanese people’s 
opinion towards the government’s foreign aid policy and make them less supportive 
to the policy. 
 
4.1.2. Domestic Bargaining 
Negative image of Taiwanese aid was also subject to domestic criticism in two 
of its constituents: political parties and public opinions. First one, criticism from 
political parties, can be exemplified by the opinion leader’s speech and their 
proposed policies during Taiwan’s presidential elections.  
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In the 2008 Presidential election, major competing parties were Kuomintang 
(KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The two parties have always 
adopted quite different foreign policies even until today because of their fundamental 
disparity in Taiwan’s political status. DPP has always been an activist on Taiwan’s 
sovereignty issue and always made a clear stand to distant itself from China and the 
KMT. On the other hand, KMT’s attitude towards China has been revising over the 
past decades. From the earliest position of defending Republic of China (ROC) as 
“the only government representing China” to Lee Teng-hui’s seeking diplomatic 
recognition of the “ROC on Taiwan,” the party basically had admitted that Taiwan’s 
legal status is to be restricted to the Island. Nevertheless, when it comes to Ma Ying-
jeou’s administration, his government no longer put forward the issue of sovereignty 
and even returned to the previous idea of “ROC as one China” (Tubilewicz 2016, 
49).  
Ma Ying-jeou pushed forward for his foreign policy during the 2008 elections, 
aiming at stopping the vicious aid competition with China that had damaged 
Taiwan’s international image. He further proposed that a warming relation with 
China is the only way to end aid competition as well as to promote Taiwan’s 
international status. In contrast to the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou, DPP candidate 
Frank Hsieh had quite different policy. Along with his affiliated DPP’s political stand 
that Taiwan is a de facto independent country, he proposed to amend the constitution 
to fit with Taiwan’s current political status. Only by doing so, he noted, can Taiwan 
be included into the international society and join the international organizations. He 
avoided to put forward any specific Cross-Strait policies directly but laid emphasis 
on improving relations with countries other than China, such as the US and Japan. 
However, in responding to previous DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s foreign aid 
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policy, he defended that not all Chen’s policy was checkbook diplomacy and warned 
that Ma Ying-jeou’s Cross-Strait policy that relied on China’s goodwill was worrying 
(Taipei Times 2008).  
A clear bargaining process between the political parties can be seen during the 
aforementioned partisan debates. In fact, most of the presidential candidates’ policies 
are not so different – except for their foreign policies, which is the part that makes 
them distinct from the other. In contrast to DPP’s firm stand on emphasizing 
Taiwan’s integrated sovereignty, KMT has been revisiting its political stand 
throughout the elections. From Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, to Chen Chui-
bian’s presidencies, Taiwan’s policy towards China has slightly revisited in order to 
cater to the general public opinion. Ma Ying-jeou’s Cross-Strait policy during the 
2008 election was clearly a strategy to distant himself from his opponent, DPP 
candidate Frank Hsieh, and the previous president’s policy. As previously discussed, 
Chen Shui-bian’s foreign aid policy had long been criticized not only domestically 
but internationally of adopting illegitimate practices. Under these circumstances, 
distant himself from Chen would give Ma Ying-jeou a better chance of winning the 
presidential election. 
Another actor in the domestic bargaining process is the opinion of the general 
public and its representation through political parties. This can be exemplified by the 
opinion polls during Chen Shui-bian. Most of the opinion polls during Chen’s term 
indicated that majority of the Taiwanese people were against Chen Shui-bian’s 
strategy of using foreign aid to exchange for diplomatic recognition, because this has 
linked Taiwan with negative image in the international society. For instance, in an 
opinion poll by Taiwan Thinktank conducted in 2006, majority of the Taiwanese 
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people considered that the reason why Taiwan’s international space continuously 
reduced was because of the suppression by China and the wrongful foreign policy. 
In the same survey, 39 percent of the people considered negotiating with China to be 
a better way to expand Taiwan’s international space, while 50 percent of the people 
prioritized communication and exchange with China to be the first thing in relation 
to any other foreign countries.7 As the country began to democratize since the 1990s, 
public opinion has been of great importance as the political parties and their leaders 
must consider major opinion in their policy making process in order to win votes. 
Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy is no exception. His different foreign aid policy 
that distinct himself from his opponent and his ability to realize that his win-sets lie 
in the public discontent on dollar diplomacy were what contribute to his winning in 
the 2008 election.  
Same ideology could be seen in the following election. During the 2012 
election when Ma was the president in position, he still carefully followed the 
domestic opinion in order to gain himself the bigger win-sets in the international 
negotiation. This time, he continuously emphasized the achievements of his foreign 
policy and indicated how these accomplishments had helped Taiwan improved its 
negative image. For instance, his government continuously lay emphasis on that the 
policy of diplomatic truce had allowed the country to successfully join the World 
Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer, marking the first UN entities that allowed 
Taiwan’s participation ever since the country’s withdrawal in 1971 and a fact that the 
government’s policy had expanded Taiwan’s international space. He also gradually 
                                                
7 Taiwan Thinktank opinion poll on “Taiwan’s foreign policy” (2006). Assessed December 
31, 2016. http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/ttt/attachment/article_670_attach1.pdf. 
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revisited his foreign policy in order to avoid being seen overly close to China. He 
started to lay emphasis on the Taiwan/ROC’s sovereignty and make sure that 
Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence would be intact under his foreign policy to 
avoid overly favoring China and to attract the potential median Taiwanese voters. 
This evidence, again, suggests that the majority of the Taiwanese people prefer 
an improved image of Taiwan’s foreign aid and support peaceful dialogue with 
China. Among the domestic constituents, some of them may fear being too closely 
related to China, as the DPP and the general opinion it represents. To avoid this and 
to attract the median voters, the leader in power revisited his policy to capture the 
bigger win-sets and produce a foreign aid policy that has the best probability to be 
ratified. 
 
4.1.3. International-Domestic Synergy 
Despite the disparity between major political parties, Ma Ying-jeou’s victory 
in presidential election shows that the domestic opinion favored an improved 
Taiwan’s foreign aid policy. Ma Ying-jeou’s win-sets on this matter was large. This 
put him in a better position to bargain with external actors and to reach a deal that is 
very likely to satisfy the Taiwanese constituents. The strategy he adopted to achieve 
the intended outcome is “flexible diplomacy,” or more often called “diplomatic 
truce.” The content of this policy could be best explained by the words of his 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Francisco H.L. Ou, in 2012: 
The idea of flexible diplomacy is based on the spirit of pragmatism and to find 
a space for Taiwan’s diplomacy…..both sides cross the Taiwan Strait enter into 
dialogues instead of competition, stop competition based on mutual trust, no 
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longer enter into vicious competition of “checkbook diplomacy.” Instead, the 
government promotes “economy diplomacy,” “culture diplomacy” and 
“image diplomacy.” By doing so, it reduces budget and improves Taiwan’s 
international image…...Taiwan needs to establish partnership with important 
allies and improve substantial relations with countries that do not have official 
ties with Taiwan (Chang 2015, 83).8 
The idea of pragmatism suggests that Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign policy is based 
on the idea of constructivism rather than viewing Taiwan’s international relations as 
a zero-sum game or in the realism perspective as his predecessors had done for many 
years. One can tell from the statement that the Ma Ying-jeou government considered 
the reason why Taiwan had faced difficulties in the international community was 
because both China and Taiwan had seen each other as enemies for a long time and 
therefore had engaged in vicious competition by using foreign aid as a means to earn 
diplomatic support for each other’s recognition. His words of reducing aid budget 
also hints that, since the years that Taiwan’s economic power outweighs China has 
already passed, engaging in checkbook diplomacy is no longer a feasible and 
desirable option. Doing this not only wastes the national budget but could also 
damage Taiwan’s international reputation.  
Rather than putting the Cross-Strait relations under the realism perspective, 
constructivist’s idea is more feasible for Ma Ying-jeou. Social constructivism’s idea 
suggests that international relations are neither unavoidable consequences of human 
nature nor necessary elements in the world politics. Instead, they are socially and 
                                                
8 Adopted from the 2012 Office of the President website. Original text was translated by 
the author of this paper. 
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historically constructed (Wendt 1992). Applying this idea to Ma Ying-jeou’s 
diplomatic truce, it is not so hard to understand why he thinks that Taiwan needs to 
change its perceptions towards China, making its biggest opponent believes that 
pursing peace with Taiwan is more beneficial than engaging in competition with it. 
In terms of either economic benefits or international images, he considered his 
foreign policy is beneficial to both sides. Applying the two-level game framework, 
the win-sets of Taiwan’s international negotiation with either China or with the 
international community lie in the improved image of Taiwanese aid. 
To further examined Ma Ying-jeou’s strategy, this paper finds that the 
objective of his foreign aid policy remains similar with his predecessors, even though 
that its nature has now changed from competing with China to making peace with 
China. In the 2009 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) clearly indicated that providing foreign aid forms an important part 
of Taiwan’s diplomatic objective and fits with the nation’s interests. The While Paper 
further elaborated by explaining that the purpose of providing aid includes 
“promoting ties with diplomatic allies and other friendly countries, fulfilling global 
responsibilities, safeguarding the security of fellow man, repaying the international 
community and giving full play to the humanitarian spirit (MOFA 2009, 3).”  
The reason for the government to adopt the same objective is probably because 
even though the government has reached an agreement with China, it considered that 
a certain amount of development aid was still needed to keep these allies in line. 
From the previous discussion we know that Taiwan’s diplomatic allies are usually 
small, poor, and underdeveloped. Spending most part of its foreign aid on these 




This argument can be further proved by Atkinson’s (2014) interview with a 
Taiwanese official, where he noted that even though the actual percentage of aid that 
goes to the allies has been unknown, the diplomatic allies receive the vast majority 
of Taiwan’s foreign aid. The 2009 White Paper also directly indicated the same 
priority:   
Due to its unique diplomatic situation, it is imperative that Taiwan prioritize 
the allocation of its limited resources based mainly on the need to maintain 
and strengthen relations with its diplomatic allies (MOFA 2009, 1). 
The government under Ma Ying-jeou did not just change its objective because it had 
maintained relatively warm relation with China. It still allocated the majority of its 
foreign aid resources to the diplomatic allies in case these allies might one day turn 
their back on Taiwan. 
In regards to the actual negotiation process on the diplomatic truce policy, we 
may not able to know how it went with China, but we can tell from some examples 
that diplomatic truce is not just a unilateral policy proposed by the Ma Ying-jeou’s 
government only but is tacitly agreed by the Chinese government as well. During a 
meeting between the Chairmen of American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Raymond 
Burghardt and Taiwan’s foreign minister Ou in 2009, Ou pointed out how Beijing 
has tacitly accepted Ma Ying-jeou’s diplomatic truce policy by indicating that 
Beijing was “discouraging Taiwan’s diplomatic partners’ inquiries about switching 
diplomatic recognition” and had already refused to accept some of Taiwan’s most 
important allies, including Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Panama 
(WikiLeaks 2009, para. 16). 
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Another case to demonstrate China’s agreement with the diplomatic truce was 
how President Ricardo Martinelli of Panama, despite expressing great interests in 
establishing diplomatic ties with China out of better economic interests, he was told 
by the Chinese diplomats to remain the status quo, since officially recognizing China 
at the moment would damage the recently improved Cross-Strait relations 
(WikiLeaks 2010). Therefore, not only Taiwan, China did not seem to be willing to 
do anything that could affect the warming relations at this moment.  
The reason why China was willing to accept this agreement could be realized 
as follows. Since China has now overwhelmingly larger ally numbers in contrast to 
Taiwan, this may be a reason why China was not so urgent to look for more allies.9 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, unlike DPP’s leaders, Ma Ying-jeou’s 
government did not actively bring Taiwan’s sovereignty issue to the international 
table and no longer insisted in joining major international organizations under the 
name of Taiwan but was willing to accept Chinese Taipei or other names that they 
deemed feasible. These concessions made on the issue of Cross-Strait dispute are 
probably why Ma’s diplomatic truce is possible. Although the sustainability of the 
truce remains to be seen, his strategy of making peace with China did successfully 
secure Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, losing only Gambia in 2013 (see previous Figure 
2). 
In order to achieve the intended outcome of improved Taiwanese aid, Ma 
Ying-jeou and his government had been particularly careful of its aid practices to 
avoid being involved in aid scandals. After his inauguration, Ma highlighted three 
                                                
9 Up until December 2016, China has established diplomatic relations with 174 countries in 
relation to Taiwan’s 21 allies. 
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key principles to be his government’s top priority on foreign aid. He instructed the 
relevant agencies and required them to adhere to principles of “appropriate motives, 
due diligence and effective practices when offering aid to foreign countries (MOFA 
2009, 2).” Moreover, an official has noted that President Ma had instructed the 
diplomatic officials that ‘if anyone are caught “checkbooking” then they are done 
(Atkinson 2014, 425).’ Ma noted himself in the speech addressed when visiting the 
foreign ministry, suggesting his government’s efforts to avoid scandals, 
We cannot corrupt ourselves by using inappropriate aid giving. Scandals like 
the Papua New Guinea case must never happen again. Proper aid policy could 
improve our international image as well as image towards states that have no 
diplomatic relations with us, including states such as the US, who have 
absolute relations with Taiwan’s survival and development in the international 
society (Office of the President 2008, para. 17).10 
Interactions with diplomatic allies could also be seen as another two-level 
game, where his domestic win-set of improving aid reputation reflects on his 
bargaining with diplomatic allies over the amount of foreign aid. Before his first 
overseas visit to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in 2008 (Paraguay and Dominican 
Republic), Ma announced that he was not plan to act as previous President Chen 
Shui-bian, who often announced aid packages during overseas diplomatic trips. Ma 
would neither talk about any specific aid plans with the leaders of allies nor announce 
any new aid packages to avoid being caught in scandals and to separate himself from 
the previous Chen administration as promised during the elections (Epoch Times 
2008). Ma administration also rejected the Paraguayan government’s demand for a 
                                                
10 Original text translated by the author of this paper. 
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USD 71 million grant in return for continuous diplomatic support and promised not 
to provide any new aid disbursement unless the Paraguayan government provided 
concrete plans of its money usage (Hsu 2008).  
In another example, the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Danny Phillip, 
misused USD 1.5 million aid funding from Taiwan. In responding to this diplomatic 
incident, Ambassador Roy Wu of Taiwan refused to accept the Prime Minister’s 
behavior and indirectly caused him to step down (Solomon Star 2011).  
From these aforementioned cases, we can tell that compared with the previous 
government, Ma Ying-jeou’s government was no longer willing to tolerate the allied 
government and their unreasonable requests of Taiwan to provide excessive foreign 
aid as its previous governments have done. Doing this would not help improve the 
image of Taiwanese aid and would also make Ma Ying-jeou’s win-sets at domestic 
level smaller.  
Overall, findings in this section prove that an improved foreign aid policy is 
what both international community and domestic constituents desire. This makes 
clear the objectives and constraints for the Taiwanese negotiator and determines his 
policy making. Ma balanced the public discontent and international condemnation 
on the previous dollar diplomacy by revising the idea into making truce with China 
and more carefully practicing foreign aid and less tolerating the allied government’s 
misconducts. This has successfully promised his government an improved 




4.2. Disagreement on Aid Budget 
4.2.1. International Constraint 
Constraint imposed on Taiwan’s foreign aid policy at the international level 
comes from the increasing pressure that a bigger contribution to the developing 
world is requested for the donors, and a more responsible mechanism are demanded 
when undergoing development work. UN launched its Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) as the resolution of the international society to help development and 
poverty reduction in the new century. The eight major goals proposed set up a clear 
target for countries to reach them by 2015.  
In order to achieve these goals in a more efficient way, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) passed the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness in 2005, putting forward five principles and 12 targets for 
countries to decide their development policies and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
mechanism. Paris Declaration further called upon the collaborations among donors 
to harmonize their development work and make best use of the resources.11  In 
addition to the above common goals acknowledged by the countries, a target for 
donor countries to allocate 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) to the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is requested. So far, this target has 
generally been accepted by members of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) that consists of major donors to the developing world. 
In light of the growing trend for wealthier countries to contribute more to the 
                                                




field of development, Taiwanese government has been under similar pressures that 
request it to play a bigger role in development work. Looking back to the history, the 
country has been undergone several stages of economic development over the past 
decades and has finally become an industrialized, developed country. Its economic 
strength has constantly received increased pressures from especially the developed 
countries and international organizations. The US and Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), two of the biggest donors to Taiwan during the 1960s, have frequently urged 
the government to increase its national budget on foreign aid (Lin 1999). However, 
in 2010, its ODA to GNI ratio was merely 0.1 percent and much lower than many of 
the donors and OECD-DAC members (see Figure 3).  
These targets and guidelines may not be able to directly bind the Taiwanese 
government as these guidelines are not legally binding if any countries fail to comply. 
However, as a relatively wealthier developed country and a democratic society, it is 
very unlikely that the Taiwanese government would neglect any of these pressures 
imposed on it, especially when it has been trying hard to expand its international 
space. The government of Taiwan would make sure that it is following the major 
trends to be perceived as part of the international society.  
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Figure 3. Taiwan’s ODA as % of GNI compared to OECD members, 2010 
Source: OECD, 2016 
 
4.2.2. Domestic Bargaining 
Unlike the pressure requesting Taiwan to put more efforts in helping 
developing countries, the domestic constituents have a different voice. This disparity 
can be seen from the competition among political parties and domestic public 
opinion. Early in the Chen Shui-bian’s administration, the opposing party KMT had 
urged the ruling DPP party to be more discreet with aid expenditure because Taiwan 
had just undergone several natural disasters (e.g. the 1999 Jiji earthquake) and the 
country had not yet fully recovered from the damage. The opposing KMT legislators 
considered that the national budget should be spent on disaster relief and 
reconstruction or other domestic needs instead of helping other countries (Ko 2007). 
Using its majority seats in the Legislative Yuan and support from other smaller 
opposition parties, the KMT often challenged Chen Shui-bian administration by 
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cutting Taiwanese aid budget. For instance, the Foreign Relations Committee at the 
Legislative Yuan voted to temporarily freeze the aid budget disbursed to the Latin 
America region in response to the corruption scandals involving Taiwan’s fund used 
by former Costa Rican President Miguel Angel Rodriguez and the Nicaraguan 
President Enrique Bolanos in 2004 (Su 2004).  
Domestic voice requesting for reduced aid expenditure could be resulted from 
the fact that Taiwanese people generally do not genuinely understand the nature of 
development work. Lin (2001) blamed the government to not properly educate the 
people about the importance of development aid to the recipient countries as well as 
its possible function for the government to improve its international status. Since the 
people are not well-educated or not fully informed of the government’s work, it is 
likely that they would link Taiwanese aid to the negative image of scandals reported 
by the media and still perceived Taiwanese aid as dollar diplomacy or checkbook 
diplomacy.  
Interestingly, the parties sometimes adopted narratives that were different 
from the majority domestic opinion when they were in opposition. As this paper has 
argued earlier, the political parties tend to adopt policies opposite to their opponents 
in order to alienate themselves from the other. Therefore, during the Chen Shui-bian 
administration, the KMT chose to adopt the narrative of reducing aid budget to 
alienate itself from the DPP to win over votes for the party. This argument can be 
further proved by another different narrative adopted by the DPP later when the KMT 
came to power in 2008.  
When Ma Ying-jeou became the president in 2008, competition on aid 
expenditure continued among political parties in the Legislative Yuan. However, 
 
 51 
since Ma adopted a different foreign policy that made his aid budget start to decrease 
(see Figure 4), excessive expenditure was no longer a target for criticism for the 
opposing DPP. On the contrary, the often criticized Ma Ying-jeou and his 
government that a reduced budget was “not enough” to maintain diplomatic 
relationships with Taiwan’s allies. In other words, it is not enough to satisfy the allies’ 
demands.  
Another case also shows that the major parties possessed extremely different 
opinions on the budget of foreign aid. According to the assessment report by the 
budget center at the Legislative Yuan in 2014, the budget implementation rate after 
Ma’s inauguration had been relatively low. The item International Cooperation was 
reserved for NTD 120 million in 2009, NTD 260 millions in 2010, NTD 1.14 billion 
in 2011, and NTD 2.6 billions in 2012. Further explained in the report, this budget 
reservation was resulted from the fact that allied governments often did not follow 
up with proposals or simply cancelled the projects (Chen 2014). In responding to 
this, the DPP legislators criticized Ma’s foreign aid policy had halted Taiwan’s 
diplomatic system. As a consequence, the DPP legislators proposed to temporarily 
freeze this part of aid budget for the reason of “ineffective budget implementation,” 
despite the KMT legislators defended that the government was discreet in using aid 
and did not simply waste a lot of money as the previous government.12  
                                                
12 Records of debate could be found at the Parliamentary Library of Legislative Yuan at 
http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/homePage. Accessed October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 4. Taiwan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), 2004-2015 
Unit: USD millions (current prices) 
Source: OECD, 2016. 
 
Examples of opposing parties adopting different narratives when they were in 
opposition demonstrate the long-simmering bi-partisan competition existing in the 
Taiwanese society, where the opposing party would try to alienate itself from the 
other party to earn public votes even if the criticism could sometimes be far-fetching. 
However, during this period, the majority of the constituents still preferred a 
reduced aid budget. The decision maker’s win-sets, therefore, rest in reducing 
Taiwan’s overall foreign aid budget. If the negotiator wants to reach an agreement 
on the international table that is likely to be ratified by the constituents, he or she 
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4.2.3. International-Domestic Synergy 
In light of the international pressure urging Taiwan to play a bigger role in the 
development field, while the domestic opinion wanting it to reduce foreign aid 
budget, Ma Ying-jeou’s strategies to strike a balance between the two are the 
following four: reducing overall aid budget while increasing multilateral aid, 
strengthening public diplomacy, and devoting more into humanitarian work. 
Under Ma Ying-jeou’s major foreign policy, diplomatic truce, worrying that 
Taiwan’s diplomatic allies might switch recognition to China was no longer needed. 
At least during Ma Ying-jeou’s term, Taiwan no longer have to provide a handsome 
amount of financial resource to compete with China. This policy outcome can be 
seen from the government’s annual aid budget. Although Taiwan never published its 
aid budget to specific country for it claims that the allies might compare with each 
other and ask for more, or it fears that China would win over Taiwan’s allies by 
providing more foreign aid, the overall budget of the foreign ministry has been 
released to the public since 2001. Since Ma came to presidency in 2008, foreign aid 
budget has been reduced every year as an intended outcome foreseen by his 
diplomatic truce (see previous Figure 4). This policy of Ma had captured the 
domestic constituents’ negative impression on checkbook diplomacy and their 
demand for a reduced aid budget. Therefore, despite the opposing DPP accused his 
policy of being less effective, Ma managed to not only satisfy the domestic demand 
but also secure the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, losing only one ally during 
his term (see previous Figure 2). 
Under the framework of two-level game, Ma Ying-jeou, as a negotiator, also 
had to satisfy the other level of negotiation. As previously mentioned, the increasing 
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pressure from the international society had demanded for Taiwan’s greater 
contribution to the development work. Ma Ying-jeou’s strategy accordingly was to 
increase the proportion of foreign aid that went to development aid agencies. Despite 
its inability to participate major development aid agencies, such as UN or World 
Bank, Taiwan has been member or observer of several regional development 
organizations (see Figure 5) and indirectly involved in these regions’ development 
work. For years, Taiwanese government had been continuously allocating national 
budget on multilateral aid to these organizations.  
 
Figure 5. Development aid agencies that Taiwan participates 
Name of agency Year of joining 
Asian Development Bank Since 1966 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Since 1991 
Inter-American Development Since 1991 
Central American Bank for Economic Since 1992 
Source: MOFA, Taiwan  
 
According to the OECD statistics, Taiwan’s multilateral aid had increased 
rapidly under Ma administration. Taiwan provided USD 50 millions value of aid to 
the international development agencies in 2014, compared to only USD 19 millions 
of multilateral aid in 2006 during Chen Shui-bian’s term (see Figure 6). Ma Ying-
jeou’s strategy of increasing Taiwan’s multilateral aid suggests several things. 
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Firstly, multilateral aid is usually considered less political than bilateral aid since the 
donor governments generally do not designate their aid recipients (expect or 
earmarked aid) but leave the decisions to the development agencies. For countries 
like Taiwan whose foreign aid has often been seen strongly political and diplomatic, 
multilateral aid would reduce its strong political motivations and add more 
humanitarian elements. Secondly, by increasing multilateral aid, Ma Ying-jeou also 
satisfied international pressures that urged him to contribute more to the 
development field. 
 
Figure 6. Multilateral aid from Taiwan, 2004-2015 
Unit: USD millions (current prices) 
Source: OECD, 2016 
 
Ma’s second strategy to balance the two-level game of Taiwanese aid is to 
strengthen public diplomacy. With less major scandals being reported as a result of 









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 
 56 
the government’s new direction of aid policy. The government proposed its intention 
to follow the major international development norms. One of his public diplomacy 
effort is to link the government’s development work with the sharing of “Taiwan 
experience.” This is a rhetoric that appeared frequently in Ma Ying-jeou’s aid 
discourse. Ma administration continuously emphasized how Taiwan needs to 
become a responsible donor and give back to the international community, because 
it could never have become as affluent as it is today if there has not been the 
international aid that it had once received from the international society (BBC 
Chinese 2008). It is the government’s responsibility provide foreign aid, claimed by 
the government. 
Similar discourse could be found in the discourse of the South Korean 
government. South Korea had experienced a similar path that it lifted itself from an 
aid receiving country to aid donor by using the support from international society. It 
further joined the OECD-DAC in 2010 as the first member that transformed itself 
from a former aid recipient. This successful development experience of transforming 
itself from a poor developing country to a member of the advanced country’s club 
has been continuously used by the South Korean government in its aid-giving 
discourse (ODA Korea 2012).  
Message of putting forward the public diplomacy is explicit: to justify the 
government’s aid-giving for domestic audience. As mentioned previously, 
Taiwanese people have doubts on the government’s foreign aid policy since it had 
long been linked with the terms of dollar diplomacy, corruption, bribery, and so on. 
Negative reputation made the people less willing to support the government’s foreign 
aid policy. Discourses like the “Taiwan experience” can therefore justify the 
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government’s decision of providing aid to the domestic constituents (especially when 
the aid recipient countries are usually geographically unrelated to Taiwan). It also 
highlights the successful experience of Taiwan, making the people feel proud of its 
own development experience and increasing their support to the government’s 
policy. 
Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts of public diplomacy could be exemplified by another 
fact that he announced the intention to connect with the international development 
regimes, but did not specify particular strategies that the government would use to 
achieve some of its intended outcomes. Noted in MOFA’s 2009 White Paper: 
By establishing a complete framework for international cooperation in line 
with the MDGs and by readjusting the nation’s aid model to fit with the Paris 
Declaration, MOFA is ensuring that Taiwan conforms to global trends and 
plays the role of responsible stakeholder in the international community 
(MOFA 2009, 17). 
The government announced the new direction that it would adopt the MDGs and 
Paris Declaration, which has never been mentioned by any of the previous 
governments. However, it did not propose any “new” policies or aid projects but 
simply readjust the country’s aid programs to fit with the international development 
doctrines.  
By carefully examining the 2009 White Paper we can find that the government 
simply made efforts in categorizing the existing aid programs to fit with the major 
norms. For instance, the existing aid projects and programs were thereby re-
categorized into five major focuses of MDGs (MOFA 2009, 46): 
1. Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; 
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2. Achievement of universal primary education; 
3. Combat of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;  
4. Attainment of environmental sustainability; and  
5. Establishment of a Global Partnership for Development   
These focuses were nothing new, but were the development works that Taiwan had 
been doing since the previous administrations. Ma Ying-jeou’s new direction only 
brought in the new international norms and doctrines that had never been introduced 
before. This public diplomacy trick, however, appears to bring a new leaf for 
Taiwan’s foreign aid work. Under the situation where major scandals on checkbook 
diplomacy that hit headlines has also reduced during this period, Ma Ying-jeou’s 
strategy has managed to reduce the negative reputation about Taiwanese aid to a 
certain extent. 
Lastly strategy to balance the international and domestic pressures, Ma Ying-
jeou committed to an increase of humanitarian aid and an active participation via 
international and local NGOs. According to the government’s statistics, Taiwanese 
civil organizations had contributed a lot in humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction after major disasters, such as in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake 
and the Tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis that greatly damaged Myanmar. These 
efforts had earned the media praise for Taiwanese NGOs. Approximately 20 
Taiwanese civil society organizations contributed more than USD 70 million 
humanitarian aid in the year of 2008. Meanwhile, the government had been 
continuously funding local NGOs for their cooperation with International NGOs to 
help them increase international presentation. Overall, the government’s budget on 
humanitarian aid, reconstruction and rehabilitation and its aid to NGOs had 
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increased, and the total budget reached its peak in 2015 (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Taiwan’s humanitarian aid and aid to NGOs, 2010-2015 
Unit: USD thousands 
     Source: MOFA, Taiwan 
 
What the above data shows us are as follows. First of all, since Taiwan’s 
relations with China are special and sensitive, most of the development aid agencies 
have concerns about the One-China Policy and generally do not recognize Taiwan 
as a separate member. NGOs, therefore, could work as a good platform since they 
are usually less political and generally do not involve diplomacy or official 
recognition issues. By funding Taiwanese NGOs, the government of Taiwan had 
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Secondly, major disasters often hit the headlines because of its timeliness and 
instantaneity. Therefore, humanitarian assistance that comes with the disasters would 
also be reported frequently. By increasing its aid budget to humanitarian assistance, 
the government is more likely to make the name Taiwan appear in the major 
international media. Furthermore, more humanitarianism in a donor’s aid enhances 





This paper demonstrates Taiwan’s foreign aid policy under Ma Ying-jeou’s 
presidency through the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game theory and 
concludes that Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy making was an outcome of both 
international constraints and domestic bargaining, which made him adopted a less 
radical foreign aid policy to satisfy actors at both levels. Detailed findings are 
elaborated as follows. 
First of all, throughout the examination of historical development on 
Taiwanese aid, it is confirmed that foreign aid had been used as a means to support 
Taiwan’s foreign policy goals. However, several internal factors have arisen after the 
country started to democratize, and these factors has acted as domestic constraints 
for policy-makers. Under the context of Cross-Strat dispute and Taiwan’s withdrawal 
from the UN in 1971, foreign had become an inseparable part of Taiwan’s foreign 
policy to earn diplomatic support to counter the isolation caused by its political 
situation and to expand Taiwan’s international space. This strategy had worked well 
until China overran Taiwan in economic strength. In the meantime, with the 
democratization process, the general public started to cast doubts on the 
government’s practices of dollar diplomacy and the effectiveness of them to sustain 
Taiwan’s bilateral relationships with its diplomatic allies. 
Secondly, when it comes to Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, his foreign aid policy 
making is proved to be influenced by both international and domestic pressures that 
urged the government to improve its negative foreign aid image. By applying the 
Two-Level Game theory, this paper finds that the international constraint lies at the 
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serious condemnation on the Taiwanese government’s practices of using foreign aid 
to engage in activities, such as bribing political leaders in recipient countries and 
influencing foreign elections with its aid donation. This negative reputation also 
affects the domestic opinion as the majority of Taiwanese refuse to accept the policy 
of dollar diplomacy. This discontent has been captured by the political parties along 
with their proposed foreign policy and position towards China through the 
presidential elections. Ma Ying-jeou and his party’s strategy to capture the “win-
sets” of improving the image of Taiwanese aid is the different idea from his 
predecessors to make truce with China and to practice foreign aid more carefully and 
to less tolerate allied governments’ unreasonable requests. This policy shift has 
promised his government an improved reputation and more secured donor-recipient 
relationships.  
Third finding of this paper is that, although both international and domestic 
factors have influenced Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign aid policy, unlike the agreed 
objective of improving Taiwanese aid, the two levels disagreed on the size of 
Taiwan’s foreign aid, and this influenced Ma Ying-jeou’s decision to adjust aid 
allocations and enhance his government’s public diplomacy on Taiwanese aid. The 
international community pressured the government to contribute more to the 
developing world and to adopt universal guidelines and doctrines proposed by major 
aid donors. Interestingly, this paper finds that the political parties sometimes adopted 
contradictory narratives when they were in opposition as an attempt to alienate 
themselves from other parties. On the other hand, the general public, affected by 
negative practices of dollar diplomacy, wanted the government to reduce national 
budget on foreign aid. Under consideration of the contradictory opinions of 
international and domestic actors, Ma Ying-jeou’s policy choices were to reduce 
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overall aid budget while allocate more aid to multilateral aid agencies and 
humanitarian work. Moreover, he enhanced the government’s public diplomacy by 
re-categorizing its aid programs to meet with the international development norms 
and by emphasizing the “Taiwan experience” to justify its domestic audience. These 
policies managed to balance the pressures from both levels and achieved intended 
the government’s intended outcomes. 
Based on the findings of this paper, several implications on the future policy 
making can be provided. Firstly, whether Ma Ying-jeou’s policy is sustainable 
remains to be seen. Ma’s foreign aid policy appears to work in maintaining the 
diplomatic relationships and elevating Taiwan’s international reputation during his 
terms. However, would the official relationships with allies be able to sustain if either 
China or Taiwan unilaterally breaks the truce in the future? Considering the different 
positions between KMT and DPP, it is not entirely unlikely that the succeeded Tsai 
Ing-wen and her party DPP would adopt a different, even more aggressive Cross-
Strait policy, as previous DPP leader Chen Shui-bian did. China may also shift its 
policy accordingly if the DPP leader refuses to make concessions on the One-China 
policy. In fact, the de-recognition of Gambia at the end of Ma’s presidency could 
serve as an example. Some critiques in Taiwan believe that this was a warning to the 
successive DPP government to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan strait. 
Foreign aid policy proposed during Ma Ying-jeou’s administration could sustain the 
future donor-recipient relationships deserves further discussion.  
Secondly, how should the government satisfy its domestic constituents, if the 
truce with China is no longer feasible? Ma Ying-jeou managed to elevate Taiwan’s 
international reputation and adjust its foreign aid budget to satisfy both international 
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and domestic criticism. If the Chinese government resumes aid competition with 
Taiwan in the future, it is unlikely that the Taiwanese government would react with 
the same strategy, considering both the domestic constraints on foreign aid budget 
and the much larger size of Chinese aid. Compared to the democratized Taiwan, it is 
also easier for the Chinese leaders to propose large aid projects that fit with the 
recipient governments’ needs for the Chinese leaders face smaller domestic 
constraints in contrast to Taiwan. In light of this, it is probably better for the 
Taiwanese policy-makers to think about what is the future of its foreign aid policy. 
Since aid competition is no longer a desirable option, maybe it is time to actually 
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마잉주의 대외원조 정책:  
양면 게임 분석 
 
 
특수한 양안 관계 분쟁 상황에서 대만의 대외원조 정책은 국제 
사회에서의 정당성을 확립하기 위해 대만정부가 수원국으로부터 외교적 
지원을 교환하기 위해 필요한 수단이 되었다. 이러한 관행은 대만 
원조정책에 "달러 외교" 또는 "수표 외교"라는 부정적인 이미지를 
부여한다. 2008 년 마잉주 (Ma Ying-jeou)의 대통령 당선 이후, 이전과 
다른 그의 대 중국 정책 선택은 대만의 대외 원조에 몇 가지 변화를 
가져왔다. 이 논문은 양면 게임 (Two-Level Game)의 이론적 틀을 
바탕으로 국제 및 국내 수준의 협상을 통한 정책 결정 과정을 검토한다. 
양 단계 분석에서 국제 및 국내 행위자들은 대외원조 이미지의 개선에 
대해 동의하지만 대외원조 예산에 대해서는 동의하지 않는다. 
결과적으로, 마잉주의 대외원조 정책은 이러한 양 단계의 제약 조건에 
균형을 잡는 과정에서 이전과는 다른 관행 및 결과를 제시한다. 
 
 
주요어: 대외원조 정책, 대만, 마잉주, 양면 게임, 양안 관계 
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